

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-08 H-01 INR-05 IO-04

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

AECE-00 /074 W

----- 022314

P R 290850Z OCT 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 543

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 112

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0357

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SUMMARY REPORT FOR PERIOD
OCTOBER 21-27, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE OCTOBER 15 EASTERN FIRST STEP
REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL WAS THE FOCUS AT THE
INFORMAL SESSION, IN BILATERALS AND IN AD HOC GROUP
MEETINGS DURING THIS WEEK OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.
AT THE OCT 22 INFORMAL, ALLIED REPS STRONGLY STRESSED
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THE CLOSE RESEMBLANCE OF THE OCT 15 PLAN TO EARLIER EASTERN

FIRST STEP PROPOSALS, BUT ALSO BRIEFLY NOTING POSITIVE FEATURES ON PHASING. BOTH AT THE INFORMAL AND IN SUBSEQUENT BILATERALS, EASTERN REPS CRITICIZED THE "NEGATIVE AND UNPRODUCTIVE" WESTERN REACTION, CLAIMED THAT THE EAST WAS READY TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON DETAILS OF THE INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL AND INVITED THE ALLIES TO ADVANCE COUNTER-PROPOSALS, BUT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT.

THE OCT 25 EUROPEAN PRESS WIDELY REPORTED ON A POLISH DELOFF'S PRESS LEAK TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EAST HAD PRESENTED A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL IN INFORMAL SESSIONS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A START ON REDUCTIONS IN 1975. THE EAST IS EXPECTED AT THE OCT 31 PLENARY TO PRESENT A STATEMENT MARKING THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND POSSIBLY FORMALLY TO INTRODUCE THEIR INITIAL REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL.

SUMMARY.

2. AT THE OCT 22 INFORMAL MEETING, ALLIED REPS PRESENTED THEIR REACTION TO THE INITIAL REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL WHICH HAD BEEN ADVANCED BY EASTERN REPS AT THE OCT 15 INFORMAL AS AN OFFICIAL PROPOSAL OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FOUR WARSAW PACT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS (MBFR VIENNA 332-PARA 3). ALLIED REPS POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST'S FIRST STEP REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL IN SUBSTANCE WITH EARLIER EASTERN PROPOSALS. IT ENVISAGED SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET. IT FAILED TO DEAL WITH THE CRUCIAL PROBLEM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS, BUT INSTEAD WOULD WORSEN THE EXISTING DISPARITIES AND CODIFY THEM IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL DID NOT TAKE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US AND USSR ON THE ONE HAND AND REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER. ALLIED REPS HAD OBJECTED TO THESE PROPOSALS WHEN THEY WERE EARLIER INTRODUCED. SINCE THE EASTERN PROPOSAL DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE WESTERN OB-

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JECTIONS, IT COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

3. IN RESPONSE, EASTERN REPS STATED THAT THE WESTERN REACTION TO THEIR INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS HIGHLY NEGATIVE. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL WAS A NEW METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH WHICH COULD FACILITATE PRACTICAL FORWARD MOVEMENT

IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. EASTERN REPS ASSERTED THAT THE
CONTENT OF THEIR INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL TOOK
WESTERN VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AND WAS
A DEPARTURE FROM THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION IN THAT
IT ENVISAGED US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS FIRST, AND THE US
TAKING A LARGER PORTION OF REDUCTIONS AND THE FRG LESS
THAN WOULD BE JUSTIFIED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE SHARES OF
NATO FORCES. THEY SAID THAT, WHILE THE PRESENT EASTERN
PROPOSAL WAS A DEPARTURE FROM THE ORIGINAL PACT POSI-
TION, WESTERN PROPOSALS REGARDING PHASING AND LINKAGE
REMAINED WHOLLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ORIGINAL AND
STILL UNACCEPTABLE WESTERN POSITION. AS HE HAD
WHEN INTRODUCING THE FIRST STEP PROPOSAL AT THE END
OF MAY, SOVIET REP KHLESTOV INDICATED IN GENERAL

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-08 H-01 INR-05 IO-04

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

AECE-00 /074 W

----- 023524

P R 290850Z OCT 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0544

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 0113

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

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FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

TERMS THAT IF THE WEST HAD ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE CONTENT OF A LIMITED FIRST STEP AGREEMENT, THEY SHOULD BE ADVANCED FOR DISCUSSION. KHLESTOV SAID HIS MARCH SUGGESTION THAT THERE COULD BE GLOBAL CEILINGS FOR EACH SIDE HAD BEEN ONLY AN INFORMAL PERSONAL IDEA, BUT HE DID NOT OTHERWISE REPUDIATE THAT PROPOSAL. SOVIET REPS INSISTED THAT THE PACT PROPOSAL WAS A SERIOUS ONE AND MUST RECEIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY ALLIED REPS.

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4. IN SUBSEQUENT BILATERALS, EASTERN REPS SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE NEGATIVE WESTERN REACTION, MADE MORE EXPLICIT EASTERN FLEXIBILITY ON SUBSTANTIVE DETAILS OF THE INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL AND INVITED THE ALLIES TO ADVANCE COUNTER-PROPOSALS, BUT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A FIRST STEP APPROACH. THUS, POLISH REP (STRULAK) CHASTIZED THE WEST FOR "REFUSING EVEN TO DISCUSS" THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL. STRULAK, CZECHOSLOVAK REP (KLEIN), GDR REP (OESER) AND SOVIET DELOFF SHUSTOV SPOKE SPECIFICALLY OF THE NEGOTIABILITY OF THE DURATION OF THE REDUCTION PERIOD, THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS, AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE INSTEAD OF EQUAL NUMBER METHOD OF REDUCTIONS AND "ALL OTHER ASPECTS" OF THE EASTERN FIRST STEP APPROACH. HOWEVER, WHILE KHLESTOV CAREFULLY REFRAINED FROM REJECTING GLOBAL CEILINGS DURING THE OCT 22 INFORMAL, BOTH SHUSTOV AND STRULAK STATED IN BILATERAL EXCHANGES WITH US DELOFFS THAT GLOBAL CEILINGS WERE "NON-NEGOTIABLE" AND THAT THE CURRENT EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD IMPOSE NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS.

5. THE AD HOC GROUP (AHG) ACCORDED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION THIS WEEK TO THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL, TRANSMITTING A WRITTEN ASSESSMENT TO THE NAC, AND DEBATING TACTICS FOR THE OCT 29 INFORMAL. THE GROUP AGREED THAT THE EAST HAD INTRODUCED NO NEW SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS AT THE OCT 22 INFORMAL BUT RATHER HAD BEEN SEEKING TO DRAW THE ALLIES ONTO ITS TERRAIN BY REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FIRST STEP METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH. BY SEEKING TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE OF ITS WAY OF ADDRESSING THE MBFR SUBJECT MATTER ON THE ALLIES, THE EAST WAS, IN THE AHG VIEW, SEEKING TO AVOID SUBSTANTIAL ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, THE COMMON CEILING GOAL, VERIFICATION AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES. AHG REPS CONCLUDED THAT THE WEST SHOULD AT THIS POINT

CAREFULLY AVOID ACCEPTANCE OF THE FIRST STEP APPROACH AS A NEW METHOD, CHALLENGE THE EAST TO SHOW HOW THEIR PROPOSAL IS SUBSTANTIVELY NEW OR CONSTRUCTIVE AND SEEK TO PICK UP POSITIVE POINTS (SUCH AS PHASING AND DIFFERENTIATION OF US/SOVIET FORCES AS OPPOSED TO FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS) AND DRAW THEM INTO THE CONTEXT OF THE WESTERN PROGRAM.

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6. THE EAST DID NOT ADDRESS THE ALLIED SUGGESTION OF OCT 15 FOR GROUND FORCE RE-DEFINITION AT THE OCT 22 INFORMAL. SOVIET DELOFF HAS TOLD US INFORMALLY THAT THE EAST WILL DO SO ON OCT 29, BUT DELOFF SAID THE EASTERN REPLY "WILL NOT BE VERY HELPFUL." GDR DELOFF CONFIRMED THE EASTERN INTENTION TO DISCUSS GROUND FORCE RE-DEFINITION, BUT QUESTIONED THE USEFULNESS OF SUCH A DISCUSSION AS FORCE DEFINITION PROBLEMS WOULD DISAPPEAR IF REDUCTIONS INCLUDED BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES.

7. THE OCT 24 PLENARY MEETING WAS ROUTINE, THE SOLE STATEMENT BEING DELIVERED FOR THE WEST BY FRG REP BEHREND, ON THE COMMON CEILING. THE EAST IS EXPECTED AT THE OCT 31 PLENARY TO MAKE A PRESENTATION MARKING THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE EASTERN SPEAKER WILL FORMALLY INTRODUCE THE INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL IN PLENARY AT THAT TIME. FOLLOWING THE OCT 24 PLENARY, THE POLISH PRESS OFFICER DIVULGED TO AN AUSTRIAN PRESS ASSOCIATION CORRESPONDENT THAT THE EAST HAD PRESENTED A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL IN INFORMAL SESSION TO BRIDGE EXISTING DIFFERENCES AND MOVE THE TALKS AHEAD, SO THAT A START ON DISARMAMENT VIA REDUCTIONS OF TWO PERCENT OR LESS COULD BE MADE IN 1975. THIS ITEM HAS BEEN PICKED UP BY VARIOUS PRESS SERVICES AND PUBLISHED IN SEVERAL EUROPEAN NEWSPAPERS. ALLIED PRESS SPOKESMEN HAVE RESPONDED TO PRESS INQUIRIES BY SAYING THAT WE HAVE RECENTLY HEARD A REFORMULATION OF EASTERN IDEAS WHICH HAVE BEEN FLOATED INFORMALLY ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS IN THE PAST, BUT THAT THERE ARE NO MAJOR NEW POINTS.

8. COMMENT: WHILE THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FOCUSED ON THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP THIS WEEK, KHLESTOV AND SEVERAL OTHER EASTERN REPS INDICATED THEIR INTENSE INTEREST TO US AND OTHER ALLIED REPS CONCERNING THE IMPLICATIONS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS FOR THE VIENNA TALKS. THERE IS ALSO AWARENESS AMONG ALLIED DELEGATIONS THAT ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION DURING THE FOURTH ROUND

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WILL REQUIRE EARLY GUIDANCE FROM NATO ON THE AIR FORCE
NO-INCREASE ISSUE. END COMMENT.RESOR

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: GROUND FORCES, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 OCT 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MBFRV00357
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740307-0823
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741010/aaaaaiaex.tel
Line Count: 285
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27 MAR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <23 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SUMMARY REPORT FOR PERIOD OCTOBER 21-27, 1974
TAGS: PARM, US, UR, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005